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Abstract—This paper describes the ICPR2018 fraud detection
contest, its data set, evaluation methodology, as well as the
different methods submitted by the participants to tackle the
predefined tasks. Forensics research is quite a sensitive topic.
Data are either private or unlabeled and most of related works
are evaluated on private datasets with a restricted access.
This restriction has two major consequences: results cannot
be reproduced and no benchmarking can be done between
every approach. This contest was conceived in order to address
these drawbacks. Two tasks were proposed: detecting documents
containing at least one forgery in a flow of documents and
spotting and localizing these forgeries within documents. An
original dataset composed of images and texts of French receipts
was provided to participants. The results they obtained are
presented and discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, the explosion of the volume of digital
document images and the development of consumer tools
to forge these images has led to a huge increase in the
number of corrupted documents. The development of many
tools and methods to detect modifications has also increased
but benchmarking remains a challenge.
With all the benefits it comes with, development of tech-
nologies has also an important side effect. For instance, num-
ber of amateur fraudsters has increased. Actually, it is quite
accessible for many people to scan any document (payslip,
bill, etc. ), modify one or several critical field (name, date,
amount of money, etc. ) and print it with common devices
and basic softwares (MS Paint, Gimp, etc. )
For institutions and companies, fraud can be considered
as a real plague as shown by the many studies that were
undertaken during previous years. A first one conducted in
2016 by Price Waterhouse Coopers reveals that 36% of the
5125 companies are victims of frauds. The estimated economic
cost exceeds 50k$ for 53% of the surveyed companies. Beyond
this financial cost, the reduction of the employees’ motivation
and, the cost on the company’s relations with the public and
its partners are major collateral damage directly impacting
the company’s trust capital. ICAR had a study conducted on
banking fraud in Spain stating that almost half of Spanish
users have experienced attempts to defraud. Out of the victims
of successful fraud, 33% of them did not recover the money
they lost and frauds cost on average 218 for each of them. In
one hand, all these studies show the necessity to act in fraud
prevention and detection. But on the other hand, as far as we
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know, no contest is organized on fraudulent documents and
not so many studies are leaded on this topic. We hope that
this contest will help to make the focus on this domain.
If these figures present fraud in a global way, one cant ignore
frauds on documents. Because they can be easily modified
with common and usual tools, frauds on documents have
seriously increased. For instance, a dishonest person can be
easily attempted to modify amount of purchases on types of
document admitted as evidence, such as invoices or receipts,
in order to earn more money from insurance in case of theft
or fire. Receipts can also be provided as expense report by
employees. We can imagine there are cases of falsifications
of name of purchased products, to respect constraints of
reimbursement, or of the address of restaurant to prove the
presence at the good place. For all these reasons, we choose
for this contest to focus on this type of documents.
Recent research in document forensics are mostly focused
on the analysis of images of documents. However, we believe
that Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Knowledge
Engineering (KE) could be used to improve the performance
of fraudulent document detection. Document is not only an
image: it contains textual information that can be processed,
analyzed and verified. The aim of this contest proposal is
to provide an Image-Text parallel corpus and an unique
benchmark to test and evaluate image-based and text-based
methods.
II. DATASET
A. Corpus Collection
From December 2016 to June 2017 we collected around
2,500 documents by asking members of the L3i laboratory,
families and friends. After removing receipts which are not
French, not anonymous, not readable, scribbled or too long, we
captured 1969 images of receipts. To have the best workable
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images, we captured receipts with a fixed camera in a black
room with floodlight. Receipts were placed under a glass plate
to be flattened. Each photography contained several receipts,
and we extracted and straightened each one of them to obtain
one receipt per document. The resolution of these images is
300 dpi.
The size of images differs because of the nature of receipts:
it depends both on the number of purchases and on the store
that provides the receipt. The dataset contains very different
receipts, from different stores or restaurants, with different
fonts, sizes, pictures, barcodes, QR-codes, tables, etc. There is
a lot of noise due to paper type, the print process and the state
of the receipt, as they are often crumpled in pockets or wallets
and generally handled with little care. Noises can be folds,
dirts, rips. Ink is sometimes erased, or badly printed. This is
a very challenging dataset for document image analysis.
To extract text from images, we applied Abbyy Finereader
11s Optical Character Recognition engine. Since image quality
is not perfect, so are the OCR results. We automatically
corrected the most frequent errors, such as symbols at the end
of lines or G characters (for grammes) after sequences of 2 or
3 digits. Then, we proposed an online participative platform to
correct OCR results and get a sound ground truth. The crowd-
sourcing of the human correction is still in progress.
B. Alteration
This parallel dataset of images and texts is intended to
undergo realistic forgeries. By realistic forgeries, we mean
modifications that could happen in real life, as in the case
of insurance fraud when fraudsters declare a more expensive
price than true for objects that were damaged or stolen. We
need to get realistic falsifications (price raises, changes of
product titles, hotel address changes, etc.).
Synthesizes this step, by an automatic algorithm that ran-
domly changes some characters for instance, would mechani-
cally induce a bias that we absolutely wanted to avoid. From
this statement, the only way to meet the previous criteria is
to organize workshops with volunteers to become one-day
fraudsters. To increase the diversity of quality and precision
of forgeries, workshops are open to PhD students and post-
docs from various labs with various skills with image tools. To
have a representative sample of real-like fraudsters, it is quite
important not to restraint this job only to members of our
computer science lab but to enlarge the scope of our project
to a non-expert public, at least people who are not used to
work with digital documents or image processing tools.
As we said, the aim of these workshops is to try to reproduce
real forgeries in real conditions of fraudsters. All fraudulent
acts are made using common and widespread material or tools,
ie. a standard computer equipped with Windows 10 and several
image editing softwares, at the users choice. For each receipts,
image and text was modified simultaneously. We obtained 250
altered receipts, containing several types of modification, on
all receipt information.
C. Corpus of the training phase
Data to process was organized as a set of couples image
and text files :
• An image file formatted in png, representing one receipt
that can contain one or several forgeries
• A text file containing a textual transcription of the content
of the receipt
Participants can use only images, only texts, or both images
and texts.
For the first task, we provided a set of 500 documents,
containing 6% of altered documents. An XML file of ground-
truth shows the name of the documents and whether they are
genuine or fraudulent.
For the second task, we provided 100 altered document
(images and texts), with 2 XML files defining ground truth:
• For images, the XML file contains the coordinates of
each modification, as follows: x and y are horizontal
and vertical coordinates of the top-left point of the
rectangle bounding box that have height and width. All
measurements are in pixels.
• For texts, XML file contains the tokens, delimited by
spaces in the text file, that are forged and the line and
the column where they are located. If the whole line
is modified (or append), the forged value contains the
complete line. If the forged value is empty, it means that
information has been deleted.
There was no overlap in the fraudulent documents between
the corpus of Task 1 and the corpus of Task 2, so participants
could add the 100 documents from Task 2 to improve learning
in Task 1.
D. Evaluation tools
We provided to participants three tools to help them to train
their algorithms:
• EvalT1.py evaluates the detection of modified documents
among others in a set of documents containing both
genuine and modified documents. The evaluation script
produces a CSV file with the Precision, Recall and
FMeasure results, and, for their information, the ID of
each receipt and its status (True Negative, False Negative,
True Positive, False Positive).
• EvalT2-img.py evaluates the spotting of one or several
modifications in a set of document images. The evaluation
script produces a CSV file with, for each receipt, its name
and the Jaccard index between the set of pixels covered
by their localization results and those of the Groundtruth.
• EvalT2-img.py evaluates the spotting of one or several
modifications in a document OCR output (text file).
The evaluation script produces a CSV file with, for
each receipt, its name, and 3 measures of Jaccard index
corresponding to 3 different sets:
– set of the lines covered by their localization results,
– set of the lines and column covered by their local-
ization results,
– set of the lines, column and length of token covered
by their localization results.
This choice is due to the complexity to localize a fake
information in a line, and leave the possibility to have a less
severe metric.
E. Corpus of the test phase
The corpus provided for the test phase of task 1 respected
the same proportions as that of the training phase, i.e. 30
false documents out of 500 (6%).For the corpus of Task 2,
we provided only 80 false documents.
Participants had to send us an XML file with their results
and we calculate their scores.
III. SUBMITTED METHODS
In total, 36 teams registered to the competition. 5 of them
submitted results to Task 1, while only 2 did so for Task 2.
The following subsections provide the descriptions written by
participants to describe the approaches they experimented to
tackle the first task.
A. Fabre
We combined deep-learning with fraud detections tech-
niques to achieve more than 85% good guesses. We did not
however directly fed our network with the genuine images.
We pre-processed them before with Tampered Image Detection
methods. We tried a few, but the best result were done by com-
bining: ”Error Level Analysis”, ”Discret Wavelet Transform”
and ”Grayscale” images. We then fed the three dimensions
matrices, of the three methods, to a well known deep neural
network, Resnet152.
B. Clausner
The CFraudChecker consists of nine check modules, each
looking at a specific type of fraud. Each module returns a
fraud likelihood value between 0 and 1. The method reports
a detection if the sum of all values is greater or equal to
1. Therefore, fraud is detected if either one module is very
confident or multiple modules return a small value. Text-based
modules:
• Price variation check: Looks for price outliers
• Total to pay check: Looks at inconsistencies in article
prices and the total to pay
• Missing text check: Looks for keywords which imply
a specific piece of information, but that information is
missing
• Discounts check: Looks for inconsistencies in discounts
• Quantities check: Looks for inconsistencies in Quantity
* Article = Sum
• Date check: Looks for invalid dates
Image-based modules (using OpenCV):
• Colour check: Looks for unnatural saturation, blackness,
or pepper noise
• Erased parts check: Looks for unnatural white areas or
large homogeneous areas (which have no noise)
• Copy + paste check: Looks for identical copies of con-
nected components in binarised image
A challenge was the noisy textual input data (partially cor-
rected OCR output). A basic text normalisation is performed
(remove spaces in prices, fix decimal points etc.) but this
can be extended to cover more inconsistencies. The free
parameters were tuned manually but this can be automated
in future.
C. Verdoliva
We have implemented fusion strategies for both the detec-
tion and localization tasks.
We use three methods for detection task:
• CMFD. The first method has been recently proposed by
our team [1] for copy-move forgery detection but can be
also applied to detect inpainting-based manipulations.
• Noiseprint. The second method extracts a camera sig-
nature, called Noiseprint [2], [3], through a deep net
which removes the high-level image content. If the image
has been tampered with, an anomaly arises which can
be discovered by comparing the image Noiseprint with
a reference Noiseprint extracted from a set of pristine
images.
• StegoFeatures. The third method, proposed in [4], per-
forms forgery detection based on local image features and
linear SVM classification. The local features, originally
proposed in steganalysis [5], capture expressive micro-
patterns in the high-pass filtered image.
Fusion. An image is declared forged if at least one method
detects a manipulation.
D. Zampoglou
Our submission was based on steganographic features ex-
tracted from the entire image and used to train an SVM
classifier ensemble to discriminate between tampered and un-
tampered images. Steganographic features have demonstrated
strong performance in similar challenges in the past [4]. In
[4], a set of steganographic filters are passed over the image,
and a co-occurence matrix descriptor is formed for the entire
filtered image. [5] presented a set of 39 filters. In the approach
of Cozzolino et al, each filter is evaluated via cross-validation,
and the features produced by the most successful filters are
concatenated into a final classifier.
We followed a similar approach, where we used cross-
validation on the training set to find the most successful filters
from [5] for the dataset, but instead of concatenating we
trained individual classifiers for each filter feature, and the
final result is produced by majority voting over all individual
classifier outputs. The steganographic filters from Fridrich et al
are that demonstrated the best performance in cross-validation
are:
• s5x5 spam14hv q1
• s5x5 minmax22v q1
• s3x3 minmax22v q1
• s3x3 minmax24 q1
• s3 spam14hv q1
• s3 minmax34v q1
• s3 minmax22v q1
• s2 spam12hv q1
• s1 spam14hv q1
Each model is trained using bagging. The output for each
model is calculated by averaging all bag outputs, and the final
result is drawn using majority voting over all the models.
E. Cruz
This method aims at detecting parts of document image
that are duplicated, for instance in case of modification of
a string by copy-pasting some characters. Based on some
previous works applied on natural scene images ([?]), devel-
opped method is based on the discrete cosine transform (or
DCT). DCT is often used in image compression algorithm
because of its abality of projecting an image (or part of
image) with excellent properties of grouping energy level, and
consequently allows to held major informations on only few
coefficients. In our algorithm, we use this property to detect
and identify areas of image with similar coefficients meaning
a identical information.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Detection Task
To calculate the candidates scores for the first task, we used
the usual metrics for classification: precision, recall and f-
measure.
Some of our candidates used Machine Learning algorithms.
The first results they submitted were based from algorithms
that had been trained on the learning corpus of Task 1 to which
they had added the fraudulent documents from Task 2. This
corresponds to 130 false documents for 470 true documents,
that is about 22%, instead of 30 false documents out of a total
of 500 (6%). This was not prohibited, so we asked participants
to re-train their model only on the learning corpus of Task 1.
Table I presents the results obtained by the different partic-
ipants, with and without the documents of Task 2 included in
the learning process. Zampoglou send us two results : the first
uses identical settings to his original full run, while the second
uses a more representative class balancing during training to
account for the reduction of tampered training samples.
The last result in Table I shows a perfect detection score:
the method used finds the 30 fraudulent documents perfectly.
This surprising result is certainly due to the fact that the
corpus is very specialized. Indeed, the documents were all
scanned by the same camera, with almost identical parameters.
It would therefore be interesting to see whether this method
TABLE I
RESULTS OF TASK 1
Candidate Precision Recall F-Measure
Fabre 0.364 0.933 0.523
Cruz 0.857 0.4 0.545
Clausner 0.882 0.5 0.638
Verdoliva T1 0.906 0.967 0.935
Verdoliva T1+T2 0.935 0.967 0.951
Zampoglou T1 0.964 0.9 0.931
Zampoglou T1 balanced 1.0 0.9 0.947
Zampoglou T1+T2 1.0 1.0 1.0
obtains equivalent scores on a corpus made up of images
from different cameras under different lighting and inclination
conditions. We can cite the use of smartphones, for example,
to scan cash register receipts, as part of applications for
reimbursing mission expenses or fidelity accounts.
B. Human Baseline
In order to compare these results to a human baseline, we
asked 5 people to detect false documents on the test corpus of
Task 1. To do this, an interface provided them with a receipt
image of the test corpus and they had to click on the ”true” or
”false” button, which allowed them to display the following
image. Each annotator processed the 500 images in the corpus,
proposed in a random order, knowing the rate of fraudulent
documents in this corpus. The annotators had several days to
process the entire corpus, and had feedback on their results
and those of the other annotators at mid-term. Table II shows
their Precision, Recall and F-measure scores.
These scores show that it is difficult for a non-specialist
human to detect a false document (many false negatives, hence
a low recall), and that many documents appear suspicious even
though they are authentic (many false positives, hence low
precision).
We observe that the average processing time of a sales
receipt under these conditions is 20 seconds per ticket, being
concentrated on this single task. Indeed, beyond the quick
inspection to detect visible anomalies (characters of an abnor-
mal color or font, strange streaks...), the annotators checked
if the information was coherent between them (sums of the
prices corresponding to the total and the payment, good
number of displayed articles, etc.) and if there was no aberrant
information.
Of the 500 documents in the corpus, the annotators do not
agree on the authenticity of 49 of them. In addition to this, they
are all wrong about the classification of 9 other of these 500
receipts (all false negatives, i.e. undetected forged documents).
We also calculated the Fleiss Kappa between our annotators,
which is 0.4375. This measure is used to calculate the inter
annotator agreement and is in an interval of 0 to 1. The Kappa
in this case shows that the four annotators only moderately
agree on the frauds they detect. In other words, some see fraud
where others do not.
TABLE II
HUMAN BASELINE
Candidate Precision Recall F-Measure
Human 1 0.75 0.5 0.6
Human 2 0.64 0.47 0.54
Human 3 0.69 0.37 0.48
Human 4 0.55 0.37 0.44
Human 5 0.45 0.33 0.38
TABLE III
TYPES OF FORGERIES IN TEST CORPUS
Type of forgery Number of documents
concerned
CPI 13
CPO 3
IMI 3
CUT 2
CPI + CUT 6
CPI + IMI 1
CPO + CUT 1
IMI + CUT 1
C. Forgeries Types
The test corpus of Task 1 contained on average 3.7 alter-
ations on the image, which corresponds to 3.5 frauds on the
text transcriptions. These modifications on the images were
made using 4 procedures :
• CPI (copy and paste inside the document)
• CPO (copy and paste from an other document)
• IMI (creation of a text box imitating the font)
• CUT (deletion of one or more characters/words)
Table III shows the types of changes made to the image in
the false documents.
A detailed comparison of our candidates’ results shows that
the errors of classification do not concern the same documents.
Indeed, all false documents were detected by at least two
methods and raised false positives were by only one method.
Thus, 70 documents are misclassified by only one candidate,
8 by 2 candidates and 3 by 3 candidates. The latter 3 were
also misclassified by 5, 4 and 2 humans respectively. They
contain CPI+CUT fraud types for two of them and CPI+IMI
for the last one. We can also observe that 5 false documents
are perfectly detected as false by the 5 candidates methods,
when one of them isn’t by four of the five humans.
V. SECOND TASK
The second task of our contest brought together only two
participants: Clausner and Verdoliva. If this does not really
make it possible to compare the results, it seemed important to
us to reward the effort of these two participants by presenting
them all the same. The second task was to locate forgeries in
documents. The methods used are as follows:
a) Clausner: Each check module [presented in III.B.]
adds fraud areas to a shared binary image. Then, the bounding
boxes of connected components in that image are reported as
fraud. The text-based modules make use of a Tesseract OCR
result to match the given input text with OCR output (which
has location data).
TABLE IV
RESULTS OF TASK 2
Candidate Mean Standard Deviation
Clausner 0,091 0,222
Verdoliva 0,426 0,261
Clausner without 0 0,287 0,315
Verdoliva without 0 0,461 0,240
b) Verdoliva: Besides CMFD and Noiseprint [presented
in III.C.], we use a further method, proposed in [6], which
exploits double JPEG compression artifacts. Fusion. If double
compression is detected, the related localization map is used
without further information, as it is very reliable. Else, if only
CMFD or only Noiseprint detect a forgery, the corresponding
map is used. Else, if both CMFD and Noiseprint detect a
forgery, we keep the connected components of the CMFD map
which overlap the Noiseprint map.
We evaluate these results by a Jaccard index between the
set of pixels found and the set of pixels of our field truth
for each document. Table 4 therefore presents the mean and
standard deviation of the coefficients taking into account all
the documents, as well as the mean and standard deviation of
the indexes which are not equal to 0, i.e. documents where
fraud has been at least a little located.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the main lessons of this contest is the low number
of participants compared to the number of registered and
interested persons. We explain this by the low state of the
art scores of most known methods of Forgeries Detection
compared to the results presented in the first Image Forensics
Challenge organized in 2013 by the IEEE Signal Processing
Society and presented in WIFS 2014. Indeed, we believe that
some registered people preferred not to submit their results.
Another lesson concerns the preponderance of image-based
methods over text-based methods. Indeed, as the receipts
are not in natural language and have various structures, it
is complicated to extract features for the Machine Learning
methods. Moreover, the corpus is in French, which does not
help international linguists extract information to process it
effectively.
In conclusion, we can say that the received results show that
the task of detecting false documents on this corpus is a solved
problem thanks to computer vision features. Nevertheless, the
fine detection of frauds, and their location in documents, is
not so obvious, as shown by the few results received for the
second task and the partial location of frauds.
The excellent results of two participants for the first task
lead us to think that it would be interesting to propose a
more complex corpus to treat, which would perhaps reduce the
possible biases of our corpus. Indeed, perfectionist fraudsters
could try to print the image and re-scan it, which would
probably change the results of the proposed approaches. We
are also thinking of extending the corpus with images taken
by other cameras than the one used for the captures and
other shooting parameters, which would perhaps complicate
the detection of anomalies in the corpus.
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